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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to study-
ing how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary
competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a
finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically
convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large popu-
lation size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading
to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the wN
limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population
limit, and the Nw limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal math-
ematical definitions of the Nw and wN limits are provided. Applying
these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we
obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions
for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions
for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be fa-
vored over a neutral mutation, are different in the Nw and wN limits.
However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one
strategy to be favored over another.
1
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982; Maynard Smith and Price,
1973; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1997; Broom and Rychta´r, 2013)
is a framework for modeling the evolution of behaviors that affect others.
Interactions are represented as a game, and game payoffs are linked to repro-
ductive success. Originally formulated for infinitely large, well-mixed popula-
tions, the theory has been extended to populations of finite size (Taylor et al,
2004; Nowak et al, 2004; Imhof and Nowak, 2006; Lessard and Ladret, 2007)
and a wide variety of structures (Nowak and May, 1992; Blume, 1993; Ohtsuki et al,
2006; Tarnita et al, 2009; Nowak et al, 2010; Allen and Nowak, 2014).
Calculating evolutionary dynamics in finite and/or structured popula-
tions can be difficult—in some cases, provably so (Ibsen-Jensen et al, 2015).
To obtain closed-form results, one often must pass to a limit. Two limits
in particular have emerged as both mathematically convenient and biologi-
cally relevant: large population size and weak selection. The weak selection
limit means that the game has only a small effect on reproductive success
(Nowak et al, 2004). With these limits, many results become expressible in
closed form that would not be otherwise.
Often one is interested in combining these limits. However, a central
theme in mathematical analysis is that limits can be combined in (infinitely)
many ways. It is therefore important, when applying the large-population
and weak-selection limits, to be clear how they are being combined. As a first
step, Jeong et al (2014) introduced the terms Nw limit and wN limit. In the
Nw limit, the large population limit is taken before the weak selection limit,
while in the wN limit the order is reversed. Informally, in the Nw limit, the
population becomes large “much faster” than selection becomes weak, while
the reverse is true for the wN limit. While there are infinitely many ways of
combining the large-population and weak-selection limits, the Nw and wN
limits represent two extremes in which one limit is taken entirely before the
other.
Here we provide formal mathematical definitions of the wN and Nw lim-
its, which were lacking in the work of Jeong et al (2014). We then apply
these limits to the Moran process in evolutionary game theory (Moran, 1958;
Taylor et al, 2004; Nowak et al, 2004). We obtain asymptotic expressions
for fixation probability under these limits, and show how these expressions
differ depending on the order in which limits are taken. We also analyze
criteria for evolutionary success under these limits. Our results are summa-
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Table 1: Summary of results.
wN limit Nw limit
ρA
1
N
+ w
6
(a+ 2b− c− 2d) + o(w)


o(w) b ≤ d
o(w) b > d and a+ b < c+ d
(b− d)w + o(w) b > d and a+ b > c+ d
b−d
2
w + o(w) b > d and a+ b = c+ d
ρA >
1
N
a+ 2b > c+ 2d, or (b > d and a+ b ≥ c+ d), or
(a+ 2b = c+ 2d and b > c) (b = d and a > c), or
(b = d, a = c and b > c)
ρA > ρB
a+ b > c+ d, or a+ b > c+ d, or
(a+ b = c+ d and b > c) (a+ b = c+ d and b > c)
rized in Table 1 and Figure 1. We show how these limits shed new light on
familiar game-theoretic concepts such as evolutionary stability, risk domi-
nance, and the one-third rule. We also formalize and strengthen some previ-
ous results in the literature (Nowak et al, 2004; Antal and Scheuring, 2006;
Bomze and Pawlowitsch, 2008).
Our paper is organized as follows. First we describe the model and define
the wN and Nw limits. We then consider the case of constant fitness as a
motivating example. Finally, we present the results of our analysis, first for
the wN limit and then the Nw limit. For each limit, we derive the fixation
probability for a strategy, as well as determine two conditions that measure
the success of that strategy. The first condition compares the strategy’s
fixation probability to that of a neutral mutation. The second compares the
fixation probability of one strategy to the other.
2 Model
In the Moran process (Moran, 1958; Taylor et al, 2004; Nowak et al, 2004),
a population of size N consists of A and B individuals. Interactions are
described by a game
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
. (1)
3
∼ (bd)w + o(w)
A ∼ ½(b d)w + o(w)
limit
(a) (b)
ρA >  
1
N
limit
(c)
ρA >  
1
N
wN limit
(d)
Figure 1: Summary of our results. (a) Asymptotic expressions for ρA under
the Nw limit in different parameter regions. The dashed line indicates the
border case a+ b = c+ d. (b) In both the wN limit and Nw limit, ρA > ρB
if a+ b > c+ d. (c) The order of limits matters when comparing the fixation
probability of A (ρA) with that of a neutral mutation (1/N). In the Nw
limit, ρA > 1/N if b > d and a + b ≥ c + d. (d) In the wN limit, ρA > 1/N
if a + 2b > c+ 2d.
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The fitnesses of A and B individuals are defined, respectively, as expected
payoffs:
fA(i) =
a(i− 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1 ,
fB(i) =
ci+ d(N − i− 1)
N − 1 ,
(2)
where i indicates the number of A individuals. Each time-step, an individual
is chosen to reproduce proportionally to its fitness, and an individual is chosen
with uniform probability to be replaced.
This process has two absorbing states: i = N , where type A has become
fixed, and i = 0, where type B has become fixed. The fixation probability
of A, denoted ρA, is the probability that type A will become fixed when
starting from a state with a single A individual (i = 1). Similarly, the
fixation probability of B is denoted ρB and defined as the probability that
type B will become fixed when starting from a state with single B individual
(i = N −1). The fixation probability of A can be calculated as (Taylor et al,
2004)
ρA =
1
1 +
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
j=1
fB(j)
fA(j)
. (3)
The ratio of fixation probabilities is given by
ρA
ρB
=
N−1∏
j=1
fA(j)
fB(j)
. (4)
Weak selection is introduced via the following transformation of the payoff
matrix: (
a b
c d
)
7→
(
1 + wa 1 + wb
1 + wc 1 + wd
)
. (5)
The parameter w > 0 quantifies the strength of selection. A result is said to
hold under weak selection if it holds to first order in w as w → 0 (Nowak et al,
2004).
The success of strategy A is quantified in two ways (Nowak et al, 2004).
The first, ρA > 1/N , is the condition that selection will favor strategy A over
a neutral mutation (a type for which all payoff matrix entries are equal to 1).
The second condition compares the two fixation probabilities. If ρA > ρB,
we say that strategy A is favored over strategy B.
5
3 Limit Definitions
We provide here formal mathematical definitions of the wN limit, in which
the weak selection is applied prior to taking the large population limit, and
the Nw limit, in which these are reversed. We define what it means for a
statement to hold true, as well as for a function to have a particular asymp-
totic expansion, in each of these limits.
Definition 1. Statement S(N,w) is True in the wN limit if
(∃N∗ ∈ N).(∀N ≥ N∗).(∃w∗ > 0).(∀w, 0 < w < w∗).(S(N,w) is True).
Definition 2. For functions f(N,w) and g(N,w), we say that f(N,w) ∼
g(N,w) + o(w) in the wN limit if and only if
f(N,w) = g(N,w) + wR(N,w),
where limN→∞ limw→0R(N,w) = 0.
Definition 3. Statement S(N,w) is True in the Nw limit if
(∃w∗ > 0).(∀w, 0 < w < w∗).(∃N∗ ∈ N).(∀N ≥ N∗).(S(N,w) is True).
Definition 4. For functions f(N,w) and g(N,w), we say that f(N,w) ∼
g(N,w) + o(w) in the Nw limit if and only if
f(N,w) = g(N,w) + wR(N,w),
where limw→0 limN→∞R(N,w) = 0.
4 Example: Constant Fitness
We illustrate the difference between the Nw and wN limits using the special
case of constant fitness. In this case, the payoffs to A and B are set to
constant values fA = 1 + s and fB = 1, independent of the population state
i, where s > −1 is the selection coefficient of A. The fixation probability of
A is (Moran, 1958)
ρA =
1− (1 + s)−1
1− (1 + s)−N . (6)
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In the limits of large population size (N →∞) and weak selection (s→
0), the asymptotic expansion of ρA is different depending on the order in
which the limits are taken (Figure 2). (Note that in the constant-fitness
case, selection strength can be quantified by |s| rather than w.) In the wN
limit, we have
ρA ∼ 1
N
+
s
2
+ o(s),
whereas in the Nw limit,
ρA ∼
{
0 if s ≤ 0
s+ o(s) if s > 0.
Although the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability differ under
the two limit orderings, the conditions for success are the same. This is
because, for any s > −1 and N ≥ 2, type A is favored over a neutral
mutation (ρA > 1/N), according to Eq. (6), if and only if s > 0. Likewise, A
is favored over B (ρA > ρB) if and only if s > 0. Since these conditions apply
to arbitrary s and N , they remain valid under any limits of these parameters.
5 Results
Having motivated our investigation using the case of constant selection, we
now consider an arbitrary payoff matrix (1). We analyze the wN limit first,
followed by the Nw limit.
5.1 wN Limit
In the wN limit we first apply weak selection and then consider large pop-
ulation size. Results for ρA are presented first, followed by conditions for
success.
Theorem 1. In the wN limit, ρA ∼ 1N + w6 (a+ 2b− c− 2d) + o(w).
This theorem formalizes a result of Nowak et al (2004).
Proof. We apply weak selection to the fitnesses in Eq. (2):
fA(i) = 1 + w
a(i− 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1 ,
fB(i) = 1 + w
ci+ d(N − i− 1)
N − 1 .
(7)
7
(a)
(b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 2: Fixation probability vs. selection coefficient for constant selection.
(a) Fixation probability ρA, given by Eq. (6), is an increasing function of
the selection coefficient s. (b) When selection is weak (|s| ≪ 1), fixation
probability is approximately linear in s. (c) For large population size (N →
∞), fixation probability goes to zero for s ≤ 0, and there is a corner in the
graph at s = 0. (d) In the wN limit, weak selection is applied first followed
by large population size, resulting in ρA ∼ 1/N + s/2 + o(s). (e) In the
Nw limit, the limit N →∞ is applied first followed by weak selection. The
result is a piecewise-linear function which is zero for s ≤ 0 and has slope 1
for s > 0. Population size is N = 5, 10, 103, 103, and 104 in panels (a)-(e),
respectively.
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Substituting Eq. (7) into (3) and taking a Taylor expansion about w = 0
gives
ρA =
1
N
+
w
6N
(N(a + 2b− c− 2d)− (2a+ b+ c− 4d)) + wQ(N,w), (8)
where limw→0Q(N,w) = 0. We regroup,
ρA =
1
N
+
w
6
(a + 2b− c− 2d) + wR(N,w),
and define the remainder term as R(N,w) = Q(N,w)− 1
6N
(2a+ b+ c− 4d).
By taking the limit of R(N,w) first as w → 0 then as N →∞, we find that
lim
N→∞
lim
w→0
R(N,w) = lim
N→∞
lim
w→0
(
Q(N,w)− 1
6N
(2a+ b+ c− 4d)
)
= lim
N→∞
(
− 1
6N
(2a+ b+ c− 4d)
)
= 0.
By Definition 2, ρA ∼ 1N + w6 (a+2b− c−2d)+ o(w) in the wN limit.
5.1.1 Conditions for Success
Theorem 2. In the wN limit, ρA >
1
N
if and only if one of the following
holds:
(i) a+ 2b > c + 2d
(ii) a+ 2b = c + 2d and b > c.
An equivalent result was obtained by Bomze and Pawlowitsch (2008).
Proof. Under weak selection, it is apparent from Eq. (8) that ρA > 1/N if
N(a + 2b − c − 2d) − (2a + b + c − 4d) > 0 and ρA < 1/N if N(a + 2b −
c − 2d) − (2a + b + c − 4d) < 0. Thus ρA > 1/N for sufficiently large N if
a + 2b > c + 2d or if a + 2b = c + 2d and 2a + b + c − 4d < 0. The second
condition is equivalent to a+ 2b = c + 2d and b > c.
For the border case, a + 2b = c + 2d and b = c, we take a second-order
expansion of ρA:
ρA =
1
N
− w2 (a− b)
2(N + 2)(N + 1)(N − 2)
240N(N − 1) +O(w
3).
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For N > 2 and a 6= b, the second order term is always negative, which implies
that ρA < 1/N . Lastly, if a = b = c = d then ρA = 1/N .
Theorem 3. In the wN limit, ρA > ρB if and only if one of the following
holds:
(i) a+ b > c+ d
(ii) a+ b = c+ d and b > c.
Case (i) of this result was stated informally by Nowak et al (2004).
Proof. Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (4) and taking a Taylor expansion about
w = 0, we get
ρA
ρB
=
N−1∏
j=1
N − 1 + w (a(j − 1) + b(N − j))
N − 1 + w (cj + d(N − j − 1))
= 1 +
w
2
(N(a + b− c− d)− 2a + 2d) + wQ(N,w),
where limw→0Q(N,w) = 0. Clearly, ρA is greater than (less than) ρB under
weak selection if N(a + b − c − d) − 2a + 2d is positive (negative). The
expression is positive for sufficiently large N if a+b > c+d or if a+b = c+d
and a < d. The second condition is equivalent to a + b = c + d and b > c.
Lastly, if b = c and a = d, then from Eq. (4), ρA = ρB.
5.2 Nw Limit
In this section, we first determine the limit of ρA as N → ∞ (Theorem 4)
before finding an asymptotic expression for ρA in the Nw limit. We then
turn to conditions for success, first in the N →∞ limit (Theorems 6 and 8)
and then the Nw limit.
Theorem 4. The fixation probability ρA has the following large-population
limit:
lim
N→∞
ρA =


0 if b ≤ d
0 if b > d, a < c and I > 0
(b−d)(c−a)
b(c−a)+c(b−d)
√
ac
bd
if b > d, a < c and I = 0
b−d
b
if b > d, a < c and I < 0
b−d
b
if b > d, a ≥ c,
(9)
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where
I =
∫ 1
0
ln f˜(x)dx, (10)
and
f˜ (x) =
d+ x(c− d)
b+ x(a− b) for x ∈ [0, 1]. (11)
Some aspects of this result were obtained by Antal and Scheuring (2006).
However, their derivations used approximations that require formal verifica-
tion. Our proof confirms most of the results of Antal and Scheuring (2006)
but contradicts their result in the case b > d, a < c, and I = 0, as we detail
in the Discussion.
Proof. We first establish some basic results before considering various cases.
From Eq. (2), define the function f
(
i
N
, N
)
as
f
(
i
N
,N
)
=
fB(i)
fA(i)
=
d+ i
N
(c− d)− d
N
b+ i
N
(a− b)− a
N
. (12)
f˜
(
i
N
)
of Eq. (11) serves as an approximation to f
(
i
N
, N
)
with error:
ǫN (i) = f
(
i
N
,N
)
− f˜
(
i
N
)
=
1
N
· ad− bd −
i
N
(2ad− bd− ac)[
b+ i
N
(a− b)] [b+ i
N
(a− b)− a
N
] .
Importantly, ǫN (i) is uniformly bounded in the sense that, for N sufficiently
large, there exists a positive constant L such that |ǫN (i)| ≤ LN for all i =
1, ..., N . Specifically, for N ≥ 2a
min{a,b} , we can set
L =
2max {|ad− bd|, |ac− ad|}
(min {a, b})2 .
Therefore, limN→∞ f(x,N) = f˜(x) uniformly in x.
The function f˜(x) has some useful properties. For instance, if bc = ad
then f˜(x) = d/b is a constant function. Otherwise, f˜(x) is monotonic: the
derivative
df˜
dx
=
bc− ad
(b+ x(a− b))2
11
Figure 3: Plot of ln f˜(x) vs x, where f˜(x) is defined as in Eq. (11). This
figure illustrates the case that b > d, c > a and I > 0 (the net area under
the curve is positive). The point x∗ satisfies
∫ x∗
0
ln f˜(x) dx = 0.
implies that f˜(x) is always strictly increasing (bc > ad) or strictly decreasing
(bc < ad). Extrema must occur at the endpoints f˜(0) = d/b and f˜(1) = c/a.
Set
m˜ = min
{
f˜(0), f˜(1)
}
M˜ = max
{
f˜(0), f˜(1)
}
.
(13)
Our proof makes frequent use of the integral I of Eq. (10), which is
evaluated as:
I = ln
(
b
b
a−b c
c
c−d
a
a
a−bd
d
c−d
)
. (14)
An illustration of this integral is given in Figure 3.
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Our objective is to investigate the fixation probability of Eq. (3), which
can be written
ρA =
1
1 + S
, (15)
where S is the sum defined as
S =
N−1∑
k=1
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
. (16)
The product in Eq. (16) can be written as
∏k
i=1
[
f˜
(
i
N
)
+ ǫN(i)
]
. The bound
on ǫN (i) implies that for sufficiently large N ,
k∏
i=1
[
f˜
(
i
N
)
− L
N
]
≤
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
≤
k∏
i=1
[
f˜
(
i
N
)
+
L
N
]
.
Using m˜, the minimum of f˜ given in Eq. (13), we obtain
(
1− L
m˜N
)k k∏
i=1
f˜
(
i
N
)
≤
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
≤
(
1 +
L
m˜N
)k k∏
i=1
f˜
(
i
N
)
.
(17)
These inequalities allow for the comparison between f and f˜ .
We now split the sum of Eq. (16) as S = S1 + S2, where S1 and S2 are
non-negative sums defined as
S1 =
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
, (18)
S2 =
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
. (19)
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Let
m1 = min
1≤i≤⌊lnN⌋
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
,
M1 = max
1≤i≤⌊lnN⌋
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
,
m2 = min⌊lnN⌋+1≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
,
M2 = max⌊lnN⌋+1≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
.
(20)
Since f converges uniformly to the monotonic function f˜ ,
lim
N→∞
m1 = f˜(0) =
d
b
,
lim
N→∞
M1 = f˜(0) =
d
b
,
lim
N→∞
m2 = m˜ = min
{
d
b
,
c
a
}
,
lim
N→∞
M2 = M˜ = max
{
d
b
,
c
a
}
.
(21)
Useful inequalities obtained from Eqs. (18) and (20) are
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
k∏
i=1
m1 ≤ S1 ≤
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
k∏
i=1
M1,
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
mk1 ≤ S1 ≤
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
Mk1 . (22)
The geometric series gives
m1 −m⌊lnN⌋+11
1−m1 ≤ S1 ≤
M1 −M ⌊lnN⌋+11
1−M1 , (23)
as long as m1 6= 1 and M1 6= 1, respectively.
Now to determine limN→∞ ρA, we consider cases. We first compare b and
d. If necessary, we then compare a and c and if further required, consider
the sign of I.
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1. Case b < d
In this case, limN→∞m1 = d/b > 1 and
lim
N→∞
m1 −m⌊lnN⌋+11
1−m1 =∞.
It follows from Eq. (23) that limN→∞ S1 =∞ and consequently, limN→∞ S =
∞. Eq. (15) gives limN→∞ ρA = 0.
2. Case b = d
In this case, limN→∞m1 = d/b = 1. Fix an arbitrary positive integer
B so that
lim
N→∞
B+1∑
k=1
mk1 = B + 1.
This implies that for all sufficiently large N ,
B+1∑
k=1
mk1 > B.
In particular, for ⌊lnN⌋ > B + 1,
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
mk1 >
B+1∑
k=1
mk1 > B.
Since B was arbitrary
∑⌊lnN⌋
k=1 m
k
1 becomes larger than any positive
integer as N →∞. This proves that
lim
N→∞
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
mk1 =∞.
From Eq. (22) we conclude that limN→∞ S1 = ∞ and consequently
limN→∞ ρA = 0.
3. Case b > d
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Under this case limN→∞m1 = limN→∞M1 = d/b < 1. From Eq. (23),
S1 is bounded, and it follows from taking the limit as N → ∞ of
Eq. (23) and applying the Squeeze Theorem that
lim
N→∞
S1 =
d
b− d. (24)
We now turn our attention to S2, which requires the consideration of
subcases.
(a) Subcase a > c
Eq. (21) implies limN→∞m2 < 1 and limN→∞M2 < 1. Further-
more, S2 of Eq. (19) is bounded:
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
mk2 ≤ S2 ≤
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
Mk2
m2
⌊lnN⌋+1 −m2N
1−m2 ≤ S2 ≤
M2
⌊lnN⌋+1 −M2N
1−M2 .
It follows from the Squeeze Theorem that
lim
N→∞
S2 = 0. (25)
Eqs. (24) and (25) together give limN→∞ S = d/(b − d) and by
Eq. (15), limN→∞ ρA = (b− d)/b.
(b) Subcase a < c
In this case, f˜ is an increasing function with minimum value of
f˜(0) = d/b < 1 and maximum value of f˜(1) = c/a > 1. The
behavior of ρA depends on the sign of the integral I. Therefore,
we must consider subcases to this subcase. An illustration is given
in Figure 3 for the subcase I > 0.
i. Subcase I < 0
We will show that S2 → 0 as N →∞. Set
A˜k =
k∑
i=1
ln f˜
(
i
N
)
, (26)
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and
S˜2 =
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
k∏
i=1
f˜
(
i
N
)
=
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
exp A˜k. (27)
We will show that exp A˜k is less than or equal to some constant
multiple of ekI , where I is defined in Eq. (10).
Consider the integral
∫ k/N
0
ln f˜ (x) dx. Since ln f˜ (x) is a mono-
tonically increasing function, the left Riemann sum is a lower
bound:∫ k/N
0
ln f˜ (x) dx >
1
N
k−1∑
i=0
ln f˜
(
i
N
)
=
1
N
(
A˜k + ln f˜ (0)− ln f˜
(
k
N
))
. (28)
Furthermore, the maximum value of ln f˜(x) is ln f˜(1). Sub-
stituting this bound into (28) and rearranging, we have that
for all k = 1, ..., N ,
A˜k < N
∫ k/N
0
ln f˜ (x) dx+ ln
f˜ (1)
f˜ (0)
. (29)
Since ln f˜ is increasing, the average value of ln f˜(x) over in-
tervals [0, y] must be increasing in y. Hence for y ∈ [0, 1],
1
y
∫ y
0
ln f˜ (x) dx ≤
∫ 1
0
ln f˜ (x) dx = I.
Let y = k/N to obtain
N
∫ k/N
0
ln f˜ (x) dx ≤ kI.
Combining with Eq. (29),
A˜k < kI + ln
f˜ (1)
f˜ (0)
. (30)
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Substitute Eq. (30) into Eq. (27) to obtain
S˜2 <
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
f˜ (1)
f˜ (0)
ekI =
f˜ (1)
f˜ (0)
· e
I(⌊lnN⌋+1) − eIN
1− eI .
Therefore since I < 0,
lim
N→∞
S˜2 = 0. (31)
We must now show how S˜2 relates to S2. Substitute m˜ =
f˜(0) = d/b into Eq. (17) and sum over k to obtain an upper
bound for S2:
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
≤
N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
(
1 +
bL
dN
)k k∏
i=1
f˜
(
i
N
)
≤
(
1 +
bL
dN
)N N−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
k∏
i=1
f˜
(
i
N
)
.
Thus,
S2 ≤
(
1 +
bL
dN
)N
S˜2.
The limit
lim
N→∞
(
1 +
bL
dN
)N
= ebL/d, (32)
together with Eq. (31) gives
lim
N→∞
S2 = 0. (33)
Adding Eqs. (24) and (33), we find limN→∞ S = d/(b−d) and
consequently limN→∞ ρA = (b− d)/b.
ii. Subcase I > 0
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We will show that S2 → ∞ as N → ∞. Break up S2 of
Eq. (19) so that S2 = S3 + S4, where
S3 =
⌊Nx∗⌋−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
,
S4 =
N−1∑
k=⌊Nx∗⌋
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
, (34)
and x∗ is defined as the point where
∫ x∗
0
ln f˜ (x) dx = 0 (see
Fig. 3). Define
m4 = min⌊Nx∗⌋≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
. (35)
Since f˜ is increasing, m4 has the limit: limN→∞m4 = f˜ (x∗) >
1. This implies the inequality:
S4 ≥
N−1∑
k=⌊Nx∗⌋
k∏
i=1
m4 =
N−1∑
k=⌊Nx∗⌋
mk4 =
m
⌊Nx∗⌋
4 −mN4
1−m4 . (36)
Therefore, limN→∞ S4 = ∞, which implies that limN→∞ S =
∞ and limN→∞ ρA = 0.
iii. Subcase I = 0
We will show that limit of S2 as N →∞ is positive and finite.
Let xˆ = (b−d)/(b−d+c−a) be the point for which f˜ (xˆ) = 1
(see Fig. 3). Consider a sequence βN that satisfies
xˆ < lim
N→∞
βN
N
< 1,
and converges to a limit β = limN→∞ βN/N . We will split S2
of Eq. (19) at k = βN , such that S2 = S5 + S6, where S6 is
the right tail-end of the sum. We will show that S5 → 0 and
S6 approaches a positive constant as N →∞. Set
S5 =
βN−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
S6 =
N−1∑
k=βN
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
. (37)
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To obtain the limit of S5 we define
S˜5 =
βN−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
k∏
i=1
exp A˜k,
where A˜k is given in Eq. (26). Set C =
∫ β
0
ln f˜(x) dx. Impor-
tantly, C < 0 since I = 0 and ln f˜(x) is monotonic. Similar
arguments as in case 3(b)i show that
S˜5 <
βN−1∑
k=⌊lnN⌋+1
f˜ (1)
f˜ (0)
ekC =
f˜ (1)
f˜ (0)
· e
C(⌊lnN⌋+1) − eCβN
1− eC .
Since C < 0, it follows that
lim
N→∞
S˜5 = 0. (38)
To relate S˜5 to S5, we substitute m˜ = d/b into Eq. (17) to
obtain an upper bound for S5,
S5 ≤
(
1 +
bL
dN
)N
S˜5.
Consequently, from Eqs. (32) and (38),
lim
N→∞
S5 = 0. (39)
We now turn our attention to S6 of Eq. (37). Define
m6 = min
βN≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
,
M6 = max
βN≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
,
which have the limits limN→∞m6 = f˜(β) > 1 and limN→∞M6 =
f˜ (1) = c/a > 1. Rewrite S6 as
S6 =
[
N−1∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)][
1 +
N−2∑
k=βN
N−1∏
j=k+1
(
f
(
j
N
,N
))−1]
=
[
N−1∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)][
1 +
N−βN−1∑
ℓ=1
ℓ∏
h=1
(
f
(
N − h
N
,N
))−1]
.
(40)
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Denote the second factor on the right-hand side of Eq. (40)
by Sˆ6. We have the bounds
1 +
N−βN−1∑
ℓ=1
M−ℓ6 ≤ Sˆ6 ≤ 1 +
N−βN−1∑
ℓ=1
m−ℓ6
1 +
M−N+βN6 −M−16
M−16 − 1
≤ Sˆ6 ≤ 1 + m
−N+βN
6 −m−16
m−16 − 1
.
Now taking N →∞,
lim
N→∞
M6
M6 − 1 ≤ limN→∞ Sˆ6 ≤ limN→∞
m6
m6 − 1
f˜(1)
f˜(1)− 1 ≤ limN→∞ Sˆ6 ≤
f˜(β)
f˜(β)− 1 . (41)
Since Eq. (41) is true for all β with xˆ < β < 1, then
lim
N→∞
Sˆ6 =
f˜(1)
f˜(1)− 1 =
c
c− a. (42)
To analyze the first factor of Eq. (40), we look at the version
with f˜ , which we relate to the integral I. Apply the Extended
Trapezoidal Rule (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1964) to I:
∫ 1
0
ln f˜(x)dx =
1
N
[
ln f˜(0) + ln f˜(1)
2
+
N−1∑
i=1
ln f˜
(
i
N
)]
+O (N−2) .
Recalling that I = 0, f˜(0) = d/b and f˜(1) = c/a, we obtain
the asymptotic expansion:
N−1∑
i=1
ln f˜
(
i
N
)
= ln
√
ab
cd
+O(N−1). (43)
To compare the sum in Eq. (43) with
∑N−1
i=1 ln f
(
i
N
, N
)
, we
look at their difference:
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N−1∑
i=1
ln f
(
i
N
,N
)
−
N−1∑
i=1
ln f˜
(
i
N
)
=
N−1∑
i=1
ln
f
(
i
N
, N
)
f˜
(
i
N
)
=
N−1∑
i=1
ln
[
1 +
1
N
(
a
b+ i
N
(a− b)− a
N
− d
d+ i
N
(c− d)
)
− 1
N2
ad(
d+ i
N
(c− d)) (b+ i
N
(a− b)− a
N
)
]
.
As N →∞, we have the asymptotic expression
N−1∑
i=1
ln f
(
i
N
,N
)
−
N−1∑
i=1
ln f˜
(
i
N
)
=
1
N
N−1∑
i=1
(
a
b+ i
N
(a− b) −
d
d+ i
N
(c− d)
)
+O(N−1).
If we add and subtract (a−b)/(bN) to the right-hand side, we
obtain a left Riemann sum, which can be replaced as N →∞
by an integral:
N−1∑
i=1
ln f
(
i
N
,N
)
−
N−1∑
i=1
ln f˜
(
i
N
)
=
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
(
a
b+ i
N
(a− b) −
d
d+ i
N
(c− d)
)
− a− b
bN
+O(N−1)
=
∫ 1
0
(
a
b+ x(a− b) −
d
d+ x(c− d)
)
dx+O(N−1)
= ln
(
a
a
a−bd
d
c−d
b
a
a−b c
d
c−d
)
+O(N−1). (44)
The logarithm can be simplified using the condition I = 0.
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Eq. (14) gives a
a
a−bd
d
c−d = b
b
a−b c
c
c−d , therefore
ln
(
a
a
a−bd
d
c−d
b
a
a−b c
d
c−d
)
= ln
(
b
b
a−b c
c
c−d
b
a
a−b c
d
c−d
)
= ln
(c
b
)
.
Eq. (44) then simplifies to
N−1∑
i=1
ln f
(
i
N
,N
)
−
N−1∑
i=1
ln f˜
(
i
N
)
= ln
(c
b
)
+O(N−1). (45)
Combining Eqs. (43) and (45) yields
N−1∑
i=1
ln f
(
i
N
,N
)
= ln
√
ab
cd
+ ln
(c
b
)
+O(N−1)
= ln
√
ac
bd
+O(N−1).
Thus,
∏N−1
i=1 f
(
i
N
, N
)
=
√
ac/(bd) +O(N−1) and
lim
N→∞
N−1∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
=
√
ac
bd
. (46)
Combine Eqs. (42) and (46) with (40) to obtain
lim
N→∞
S6 =
c
c− a
√
ac
bd
. (47)
Altogether Eqs. (24), (39) and (47) give
lim
N→∞
S = lim
N→∞
(S1 + S5 + S6) =
d
b− d +
c
c− a
√
ac
bd
,
and from Eq. (15),
lim
N→∞
ρA =
(b− d)(c− a)
b(c− a) + c(b− d)√ac
bd
. (48)
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(c) Subcase a = c
In this case, f˜ is a strictly increasing function with minimum
value f˜(0) = d/b < 1 and maximum value f˜(1) = c/a = 1.
Thus, ln f˜(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1) implying that I < 0. The same
argument used in the case 3(b)i applies here. We obtain the result
limN→∞ ρA = (b− d)/b.
Theorem 4 gives the large-population limit of ρA. We now introduce weak
selection to obtain asymptotic expressions for ρA in the Nw limit.
Corollary 5. In the Nw limit,
ρA ∼


o(w) if b ≤ d
o(w) if b > d and a+ b < c+ d
b−d
2
w + o(w) if b > d and a+ b = c+ d
(b− d)w + o(w) if b > d and a+ b > c+ d.
Proof. We introduce weak selection according to Eq. (5). The integral I,
given in closed form in Eq. (14), has the following expansion as w → 0:
I =
w
2
(c− a+ d− b) +O(w2). (49)
We now separate into the cases of Theorem 4.
1. Case (b ≤ d) or (b > d, a < c and I > 0)
First note that given the expansion of Eq. (49), the condition (b >
d) ∧ (a < c) ∧ (I > 0) is equivalent to (b > d) ∧ (a+ b < c+ d). Since
limN→∞ ρA = 0, ρA ∼ o(w) by Definition 4.
2. Case (b > d and a ≥ c) or (b > d, a < c and I < 0)
Using Eq. (49), these two conditions are described by one condition
under weak selection: (b > d) ∧ (a + b > c + d). Apply weak selection
to (b− d)/b and take N →∞ to get
lim
N→∞
ρA =
w(b− d)
1 + wb
= w(b− d) + wR(w),
where limw→0R(w) = 0. By Definition 4, ρA ∼ (b− d)w + o(w).
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3. Case b > d, a < c and I = 0
Given Eq. (49), this case under weak selection is equivalent to (b >
d) ∧ (a + b = c + d). In particular, we have b − d = c − a, which
allows the cancellation of a factor of b − d from the numerator and
denominator of Eq. (48). Applying weak selection and taking N →∞
yields
lim
N→∞
ρA =
b− d
2
w + wR(w),
where limw→0R(w) = 0. By Definition 4, ρA ∼ b−d2 w + o(w).
5.2.1 Conditions for Success
To determine conditions for success (ρA > 1/N and ρA > ρB) in theNw limit,
we must first determine such conditions in the limit of large population size.
To do so, we note that
Theorem 6. ρA > 1/N for sufficiently large N if and only if one of the
following holds:
(i) b > d and a ≥ c
(ii) b > d, a < c and I ≤ 0
(iii) b = d and a > c
(iv) b = d, a = c and b > c
Proof. ρA > 1/N for sufficiently large N if limN→∞NρA > 1. From Eq. (15),
we have the relation
lim
N→∞
NρA = lim
N→∞
N
1 + S
= lim
N→∞
(
1
N
+
S
N
)−1
=
(
lim
N→∞
S
N
)−1
. (50)
If limN→∞ S/N = 0, then limN→∞NρA = ∞ since S is always positive. We
will consider limN→∞NρA for the following cases.
1. Case (b > d and a ≥ c) or (b > d, a < c and I ≤ 0)
From Eq. (9), limN→∞ ρA is positive and finite. Thus, limN→∞NρA =
∞.
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2. Case b > d, a < c and I > 0
Given S ≥ S4 and limN→∞m4 = f˜(x∗) > 1, where S4 and m4 are
defined in Eqs. (34) and (35), respectively, we use the inequality of
Eq. (36) to obtain
lim
N→∞
S
N
≥ lim
N→∞
m
⌊Nx∗⌋
4 −mN4
N(1 −m4) =∞.
Therefore from Eq. (50), limN→∞NρA = 0.
3. Case b < d
Given Eq. (23),
S ≥ S1 ≥
⌊lnN⌋∑
k=1
mk1 =
m
⌊lnN⌋+1
1 −m1
m1 − 1 .
Since limN→∞m1 = db > 1,
lim
N→∞
S
N
≥ lim
N→∞
m
⌊lnN⌋+1
1 −m1
N(m1 − 1) =∞.
Therefore, limN→∞NρA = 0.
4. Case b = d
(a) Subcase a = b = c = d
f
(
i
N
, N
)
= 1 for all i with ρA =
1
N
. Therefore, limN→∞NρA = 1.
(b) Subcase a = c and a 6= b
Here
∂f
∂x
= − (a− b)
2
N
(
a
(
1
N
− x)+ b(x− 1))2 .
Therefore, f is a decreasing function. Let
m = min
1≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
= f
(
N − 1
N
,N
)
=
a− a
N
a + b−2a
N
,
M = max
1≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
= f
(
1
N
,N
)
=
b+ a−2b
N
b− b
N
.
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Then
N−1∑
k=1
mk ≤ S ≤
N−1∑
k=1
Mk
mN −m
N(m− 1) ≤
S
N
≤ M
N −M
N(M − 1) (51)
Note that limN→∞m = limN→∞M = 1. To determine the limit
of S/N as N →∞, we require the derivatives:
dm
dN
=
a(b− a)
(Na+ b− 2a)2 , (52)
dM
dN
=
b− a
b(N − 1)2 . (53)
Applying L’Hoˆpital’s Rule and using Eqs. (52) and (53), we obtain
the following limits:
lim
N→∞
N(m− 1) = lim
N→∞
dm
dN
−N−2 =
a− b
a
,
lim
N→∞
N(M − 1) = lim
N→∞
dM
dN
−N−2 =
a− b
b
,
lim
N→∞
N lnm = lim
N→∞
1
m
dm
dN
−N−2 =
a− b
a
lim
N→∞
N lnM = lim
N→∞
1
M
dM
dN
−N−2 =
a− b
b
Therefore,
lim
N→∞
mN = lim
N→∞
eN lnm = exp
(
a− b
a
)
,
lim
N→∞
MN = lim
N→∞
eN lnM = exp
(
a− b
b
)
.
Take the limit of Eq. (51) to obtain
exp
(
a−b
a
)− 1
a−b
a
≤ lim
N→∞
S
N
≤ exp
(
a−b
b
)− 1
a−b
b
.
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If a > b (equivalently b < c) then limN→∞ S/N > 1. If a < b
(equivalently b > c) then limN→∞ S/N < 1. Thus, limN→∞NρA >
1 if b = d, a = c and b > c by Eq. (50).
(c) Subcase a < c
Set
m7 = min
N−⌊lnN⌋≤i≤N−1
{
f
(
i
N
,N
)}
.
Note that limN→∞m7 = f˜(1) = c/a > 1 given that f converges
uniformly to f˜ . Then
lim
N→∞
S
N
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
k=N−⌊lnN⌋
mk7
= lim
N→∞
mN7 −mN−⌊lnN⌋7
N(m7 − 1) =∞
By Eq. (50), limN→∞ ρA = 0.
(d) Subcase a > c
Here
∂f
∂x
=
b(c− a) + 2ab−b2−ac
N
N2
(
b+ x(a− b)− a
N
)2 .
Therefore for N > 2ab−b
2−ac
b(a−c) , f is strictly decreasing.
Break up the sum S as S = S8 + S9, where
S8 =
⌊
√
N⌋−1∑
k=1
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
S9 =
N−1∑
k=⌊√N⌋
k∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
.
Given N > 2ab−b
2−ac
b(a−c) , define
M8 = max
1≤i≤⌊√N⌋−1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
= f
(
1
N
,N
)
=
b+ c−2b
N
b− b
N
,
M9 = max
⌊√N⌋≤i≤N−1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
= f
(
⌊√N⌋
N
,N
)
=
b+ 1⌊
√
N⌋(c− b)− bN
b+ 1⌊
√
N⌋(a− b)− aN
.
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If c = b then M8 = 1 and we have the bound
S8 ≤
⌊√N⌋−1∑
k=1
Mk8 = ⌊
√
N⌋ − 1.
Dividing by N and taking N →∞ we obtain
lim
N→∞
S8
N
≤ ⌊
√
N⌋ − 1
N
= 0.
If c 6= b, we have the bound
S8 ≤
⌊√N⌋−1∑
k=1
Mk8 =
M
⌊√N⌋
8 −M8
M8 − 1 . (54)
Note that limN→∞M8 = 1. We use L’Hoˆpital’s Rule to determine
the limit of S8/N as N →∞, which requires the derivative: dM8dN =
b−c
b(N−1)2 . It follows that
lim
N→∞
N(M8 − 1) = lim
N→∞
dM8
dN
−N−2 =
c− b
b
,
lim
N→∞
⌊
√
N⌋ lnM8 = lim
N→∞
1
M8
dM8
dN
−1
2
N−3/2
= 0.
Therefore, limN→∞M
⌊√N⌋
8 = 1, and consequently from Eq. (54),
lim
N→∞
S8
N
≤ lim
N→∞
M
⌊√N⌋
8 −M8
N(M8 − 1) = 0. (55)
We also have an upper bound for S9:
S9 ≤
N−1∑
k=⌊
√
N⌋
Mk9 ≤
1
1−M9 =
b+ a−b⌊√N⌋ − aN
a−c
⌊
√
N⌋ +
b−a
N
Divide by N and take the N →∞ limit to obtain
lim
N→∞
S9
N
≤ lim
N→∞
b+ a−b⌊√N⌋ − aN√
N(a− c) + b− a = 0 (56)
Eqs. (55) and (56) imply limN→∞ S/N = 0, and consequently
limN→∞NρA =∞.
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We now apply weak selection to find conditions for which ρA > 1/N in
the Nw limit.
Corollary 7. Given the game matrix (1), ρA > 1/N in the Nw limit if and
only if one of the following holds:
(i) b > d and a + b ≥ c+ d
(ii) b = d and a > c
(iii) b = d, a = c and b > c
Proof. In Theorem 6, we found conditions for which ρA > 1/N for sufficiently
large populations. We introduce weak selection according to Eq. (5). Condi-
tions (i), (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 6 remain the same under weak selection.
Given the weak selection expansion of Eq. (49), Condition (ii) of Theorem
6 becomes (b > d) ∧ (a < c) ∧ (a + b ≥ c + d). Note that Condition (i)
of Theorem 6 is equivalent to (b > d) ∧ (a ≥ c) ∧ (a + b ≥ c + d). There-
fore, Conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 6 together give the one condition
(b > d) ∧ (a+ b ≥ c+ d).
Finally, we will determine conditions for which ρA > ρB in the Nw limit
by first investigating the large N limit.
Theorem 8. Given the game matrix (1), ρA > ρB for sufficiently large N
if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) I < 0
(ii) I = 0 and ac < bd
Proof. Eq. (4) with Eq. (12) give
ρB
ρA
=
N−1∏
i=1
f
(
i
N
,N
)
(57)
Given that ρA > ρB for sufficiently large N if and only if limN→∞ ρB/ρA < 1,
we will find this limit and compare it to 1 for various cases.
We will first look at the product of f˜ -terms and then compare it to the
product of f -terms. Since f˜ is monotonic, the left and right Riemann sums,
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1
N
(
A˜N−1 + ln f˜(0)
)
and 1
N
(
A˜N−1 + ln f˜(1)
)
, respectively, serve as bounds
for the definite integral I (where A˜N−1 is defined in Eq. (26)). This implies
NI − ln M˜ ≤ A˜N−1 ≤ NI − ln m˜, (58)
where the minimum, m˜, and maximum, M˜ , of f˜ are defined in Eq. (13).
Keeping in mind that
∏N−1
i=1 f˜
(
i
N
)
= exp
(
A˜N−1
)
, exponentiate Eq. (58) to
obtain
eNI
M˜
≤
N−1∏
i=1
f˜
(
i
N
)
≤ e
NI
m˜
.
Combining this with the inequality of Eq. (17), which compares f to f˜ , and
using Eq. (57), we obtain(
1− L
m˜N
)N−1
eNI
M˜
≤ ρB
ρA
≤
(
1 +
L
m˜N
)N−1
eNI
m˜
.
Thus, if I > 0 then limN→∞ ρB/ρA = ∞. If I < 0 then limN→∞ ρB/ρA = 0.
The only case left to consider is I = 0. In this case, Eq. (46) implies that
limN→∞ ρB/ρA =
√
ac/(bd). If ac > bd then the limit is greater than 1, if
ac < bd then the limit is less than 1, and if ac = bd then the limit equals
1.
Corollary 9. Given the game matrix (1), ρA > ρB in the Nw limit if and
only if one of the following holds:
(i) a+ b > c+ d
(ii) a+ b = c+ d and b > c
Proof. We introduce weak selection according to Eq. (5). Given the weak
selection expansion of integral I in Eq. (49), I < 0 implies a+ b > c+ d and
I = 0 implies a + b = c+ d. Furthermore, the inequality ac < bd is
(1 + wa)(1 + wc) < (1 + wb)(1 + wd),
which reduces as w → 0 to
a+ c < b+ d. (59)
Thus, Condition (i) of Theorem 8 becomes a + b > c + d and Condition (ii)
becomes a + b = c + d and b > c (equivalently a + b = c + d and a < d) in
the Nw limit.
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6 Discussion
In the analysis of evolutionary models, the limits of large population size
and weak selection are both biologically important and mathematically con-
venient. We have analyzed the effect of combining these limits, in different
orders, on the fixation of strategies in the Moran process with frequency de-
pendence. We find that the Nw and wN limits yield different asymptotic
expressions for fixation probability, as well as different conditions for a strat-
egy to have larger fixation probability than a neutral mutation. Interestingly,
however, the conditions are the same for ρA > ρB.
Our results connect to a number of concepts in evolutionary game the-
ory and population genetics. For example, the conditions for ρA > 1/N in
the Nw limit (Corollary 7) have interesting connections to notions of evo-
lutionary stability and risk dominance. A is an evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) if a > c or if a = c and b > d; correspondingly, B is an ESS if d > b
or if d = b and c > a (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). A is risk domi-
nant if a + b > c + d, and B is risk dominant if the reverse inequality holds
(Harsanyi et al, 1988; Nowak et al, 2004). Comparing with Corollary 7, we
see that in the Nw limit,
ρA > 1/N =⇒ B is neither an ESS nor risk dominant.
The converse holds outside of borderline cases where a + b = c + d.
In the wN limit, we find in Theorem 2 (see also Bomze and Pawlowitsch,
2008) that a+2b > c+2d is sufficient for ρA > 1/N , and is necessary except
in the borderline case a + 2b = c + 2d. This result is an instance of the
one-third law of evolutionary game theory (Nowak et al, 2004; Ohtsuki et al,
2007; Bomze and Pawlowitsch, 2008; Ladret and Lessard, 2008; Zheng et al,
2011). This rule can be understood as stating that the conditions f˜(1/3) > 1
and ρA > 1/N are equivalent up to borderline cases. There does not appear
to be any corresponding result for the Nw limit; thus the one-third law
appears to pertain specifically to the wN limit.
The conditions for ρA > ρB, which are the same for the Nw and wN
limits, are nearly equivalent to risk dominance, in that
A is risk dominant =⇒ ρA > ρB,
and the converse holds except in the borderline case a+ b = c+ d.
Our analysis of the Nw limit required us to first examine the large-
population limit of ρA. Here our results formalize and strengthen those
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of Antal and Scheuring (2006), who analyzed the same limit but used ap-
proximations that are not asymptotically exact in all cases. Our results in
Theorem 4 confirm those of Antal and Scheuring (2006) except in the bor-
derline case b > d, a < c and I = 0. In that case we have shown that
lim
N→∞
ρA =
(b− d)(c− a)
b(c− a) + c(b− d)√ac
bd
,
which contradicts Antal and Scheuring’s claim that limN→∞ ρA = (b−d)/2b.
These expressions are not equivalent; for example, they differ for the payoff
matrix (
e 2e
4 4
)
,
which satisfies the conditions b > d, a < c, and I = 0. We can trace the
difference to Antal and Scheuring’s replacement of the sum A˜k, defined in
our Eq. (27), by its integral approximation.
Here we have analyzed the wN and Nw limits for the Moran model of
a well-mixed population with overlapping generations. These limits can also
be applied to other processes, where they may lead to novel questions or
shed new light on existing results. One interesting example is the Wright-
Fisher model (Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1931), in which generations are non-
overlapping. In the case of a constant selection coefficient s > 0, Haldane
(1927) obtained the well-known approximation ρ ≈ 2s. We expect that this
approximation will be asymptotically exact in the Nw limit; for the wN limit
we anticipate a different result of the form ρ ∼ 1/N + Ks + o(s) for some
positive coefficient K. These limits can also be studied for Wright-Fisher
model with games (Imhof and Nowak, 2006), leading to discrete-generation
analogues of the results presented here.
Games on graphs (Ohtsuki et al, 2006; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007; Allen and Nowak,
2014) represent another important application. For the case of the cy-
cle (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006), the wN and Nw limits were studied by
Jeong et al (2014), although without formal definitions and without con-
sidering borderline cases. For regular graphs, Ohtsuki et al (2006) obtained
results that appear to pertain to the wN limit; finite-N corrections to these
were later developed by Taylor et al (2007) and Chen (2013). It is not clear
whether theNw limit is tractable for games on general graphs. Ibsen-Jensen et al
(2015) showed that, for arbitrary graphs and nonweak selection, the prob-
lem of determining fixation probability is PSPACE-hard. It is therefore very
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difficult to analyze evolutionary games on graphs without taking the weak
selection limit at the outset. However, this does not necessarily preclude
computationally feasible conditions for success in the Nw limit for at least
some classes of graphs.
Finally, we reiterate that the Nw and wN limits represent only two of
infinitely many ways to combine the large-population and weak-selection lim-
its. In the most general case, one considers an arbitrary sequence of pairs
{(wj, Nj)}∞j=1 such that wj → 0 and Nj → ∞ as j → ∞. It is clear from
our results that expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success
will depend on the sequence in question. The Nw and wN limits represent
two extremes in which one limit is taken much faster than the other. It may
be supposed that results for other limiting schemes will lie between these
extremes in some sense.
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